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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses a key interest in Keith Pavitt’s later work (Pavitt, 1998; 2002); the 
organisational arrangements for co-ordinating technological knowledge. It also concurs with 
Pavitt’s insistence on the constraints on managerial agency and his nihilistic amusement at 
frustrated plans.  
 
The paper analyses two case studies of organisations attempting to manage transitions aimed 
at improved co-ordination processes. These are similar firms in high-tech, multi-technology, 
knowledge-intensive businesses. Both are project-based, in the same geographical region and 
about the same size, yet they have taken their organisations in contrary directions. The first 
has moved from organisation around functional disciplines to product-based, cross-functional 
teams, while the second has done the reverse. The paper reviews the effects of these different 
organisational solutions on the processes of knowledge integration within the firms, the 
effects on communities of practice and the ways in which the systems have developed and 
adapted in response to the reorganisations. It challenges many of the simplistic prescriptions 
offered in the literature and provides further fuel for the debates over corporate initiatives and 
the knowledge integration task. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Keith Pavitt in his later work had a healthy interest in the organisational arrangements for co-
ordinating technological knowledge (Pavitt, 1998; 2002). With Ove Granstrand and Pari Patel 
he showed empirically the increasing range of knowledge bases and specialisations required 
to produce contemporary products and systems (Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt, 1997). Taking 
issue with the vogue for ‘core competences’ they argued in favour of ‘distributed 
competences’ in Multi-Technology Corporations. But it was an intriguing puzzle how 
organisations might co-ordinate all these specialisms. Pavitt was clear that not all knowledge 
could be outsourced and was critical of firms that allowed their technological activities to be 
run down. His nihilistic streak enjoyed high profile failures when carefully designed plans 
were frustrated. He was sceptical of many of the fashionable prescriptions for organisational 
solutions to the problem of complex knowledge requirements.  
 
With Stefano Brusoni and Andrea Prencipe he challenged the view that modular product 
architecture should be matched by a corresponding organisation design. Brusoni, Prencipe 
and Pavitt (2001) argued that the knowledge bases of firms reach far beyond the boundaries 
of their production activities. Through their analysis of patenting activities they showed that 
firms typically retain knowledge associated with those modules that are routinely outsourced. 
It was a typically Pavittesque sceptical approach to investigate empirically an intuitively 
appealing but simplistic recipe, albeit at a comfortable distance!  
 
This paper explores the issue of how technical disciplines might and should be organised in 
the firm. It attempts to draw together the Pavitt-eye view of knowledge bases and 
organisations with the management literature. The concept of “knowledge bases” is 
operationalised at the level of the team and how the individual engineers that work therein 
share their knowledge.  
 
It is a commonly found proposition in the management literature that cross-functional teams 
or matrix style organisation is associated with better knowledge sharing, and consequently 
better performance than pure functional forms (for example, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; 
and most recently Cummings, forthcoming). In general a high frequency of knowledge 
sharing outside of the group has long been established as positively related to performance, as 
gatekeeper individuals pick up and import vital signals and understanding (Allen, 1984; 
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Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Brown and Utterback, 1985). In particular, cross-functional 
composition in teams is argued to permit access to disciplinary knowledge bases outside 
(Keller, 2001; Sapsed et al., 2002). Given the necessary range of knowledge bases in Multi 
Technology Firms, should organisations be arranged in cross-functional teams? Does this 
make productive knowledge sharing more or less likely? What are the effects on technical 
advancement in the disciplines?  
 
However the paper is not a deductive study testing the proposition of cross-functional 
knowledge sharing associating with performance. Rather it takes a step back to examine the 
first part of the proposition; it asks what quality of knowledge sharing is effected by cross-
functional or functional teamworking organisation. It takes an inductive approach to uncover 
the motivations, tools, effects and managerial issues involved with reorganisation to cross-
functional teams. 
 
The paper analyses two case studies of organisations attempting to manage transitions aimed 
at improved co-ordination processes. These are similar firms in high-tech, multi-technology, 
knowledge-intensive businesses. Both are project-based, in the same geographical region and 
about the same size, yet they have taken their organisations in contrary directions. The first 
has moved from organisation around functional disciplines to product-based, cross-functional 
teams, while the second has done the reverse. The paper reviews the effects of these different 
organisational solutions on the processes of knowledge integration within the firms, the 
effects on communities of practice and the ways in which the systems have developed and 
adapted in response to the reorganisations. In keeping with a Pavitt approach it challenges 
many of the simplistic prescriptions offered in the literature and provides further fuel for the 
debates over corporate initiatives and the knowledge integration task. 
 
The next section in the paper reviews the literature on cross-functional teamworking pointing 
out the controversy over its purported advantages. It shows that there are tensions generated 
by cross-functional team structures. The third section addresses these tensions by looking at 
the received theory on social identification and the more recent work on communities of 
practice. Section Four outlines the method for the study an inductive approach based on 
grounded theory procedures that attempt to guard against tautological research. Section Five 
outlines five categories that were common across the two companies: organisational change; 
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knowledge integration; loss effects and problems; deployment of expertise and evolution. 
The conclusions follow in Section Six. 
 
2. Cross-Functional Teamworking 
 
Cross-functional teamworking has emerged as an important imperative for organisations, and 
the subject of considerable managerial and scholarly attention. Empirical research suggests 
that most New Product Development (NPD) activity uses the cross-functional form (Griffin, 
1997). Gobeli & Larson (1987) present data for a sample of 1634 project managers in NPD, 
construction and new services and processes where less than 50% of managers used a pure 
functional structure, while 85% used some form of cross-functional matrix structure. As 
regards performance, Holland et al.’s (2000) review shows that inter-functional 
communication and transparency was correlated or associated with successful NPD projects.  
 
Cross-functionality is only one type of diversity that is said to benefit teamworking 
outcomes, alongside age, gender, ethnicity, personal background etc. Roberts (1987) asserts 
that diversity of technical background, age and values appears to heighten project team 
performance, as well as maintaining tension and challenge in the team. Too much similarity, 
comfort and familiarity reduces productivity and tends against the refreshment of technical 
knowledge through external contacts. Leonard & Sensiper (1998) argue that although 
diversity entails the management of divergent viewpoints, this “creative abrasion” can 
generate discussion and thought resulting in new ideas. Leonard & Sensiper suggest 
“…intellectually heterogeneous groups are more innovative than homogeneous ones.” (1998: 
118).  
 
However, research on diverse teams also shows that group members tend to have lower job 
satisfaction, higher turnover and stress (Keller, 2001). By contrast to traditional functional 
silos, in terms of knowledge management there is a problem to co-ordinate a diverse set of 
areas of expertise (Denison et al., 1996). While various authors argue that for systemic tasks 
like NPD, Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs) are more effective, Roberts (1987) and Allen 
(1984) claim functional organisations show best technical performance. This is contested by 
Gobeli & Larson’s (1987) study, which shows that project managers generally felt that 
dedicated Cross-Functional project teams and project matrix type structures were judged 
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most effective on criteria of technical performance, costs and schedule. More functional 
configurations were considered ineffective.  
 
Roberts (1987) warns of the erosion of technical skills if a cross-functional project team is 
maintained over time. Engineers are removed from the disciplinary structure of their 
functions, and while matrix organisation is a noble ideal, usually one interest dominates. 
There is often tension and conflict. Members of cross-functional teams, which are typically 
temporary, working groups, often act as champions of their respective functions (Denison et 
al., 1996). Donnellon (1993) refers to team members withholding their functional knowledge 
from the CFT as a means of defending functional territory. As a practical solution Donnellon 
suggests shifting the role of the functional manager away from controlling the resources that 
are “made available” to CFTs, in favour of a “supplier” role; teams themselves should be 
responsible for delivery. This generally supports Gobeli & Larson’s position above that 
recommends the balance of responsibility in favour of project team managers. 
 
 
3. Teamworking, Identity and Communities of Practice 
 
These tensions could simply be interpreted as the group-serving bias observed in behavioural 
decision-making research, which is shown to have an even greater effect than self-serving 
biases (Taylor & Doria, 1981). However, individual and group identity is another notion 
fraught with problems and factorial issues. Social identification theory suggests that the 
immediate group is often more salient for the individual, than an abstract, secondary 
organisation, as the immediate group is where interpersonal proximity and task 
interdependence is greatest (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). The immediate group can be a 
functional discipline or project team, but typically individuals have multiple, conflicting 
identities in the organisation. These are usually unresolved and are managed separately; 
“compartmentalised”, sometimes giving rise to hypocrisy and “selective forgetting” 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 35).  
 
For the ethnomethodology field - the study of sense making in everyday life- the team 
context, is not so much imposed by the external functions of the collected team members, as 
negotiated and achieved through the individuals’ interactions in the team setting (Sharrock, 
1974; Housley, 2000). Work on individual and group productivity bears this out, Roberts 
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(1987) observes that in the innovation literature the nature of the immediate work group in 
terms of composition and supervision matter greatly to productivity among technical 
professionals, in addition to exogenous factors like the individuals’ job maturity.  
 
This somewhat dated debate becomes relevant again with the current interest in 
“communities of practice”, as described by Lave & Wenger (1991) and Brown and Duguid 
(1991) – “These groups of interdependent participants provide the work context within which 
members construct both shared identities and the social context that helps those identities to 
be shared.” (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 202). These communities naturally emerge around local 
work practice and so tend to reinforce “balkanisation” around functions or occupation, but 
also extend to wider, dispersed networks of similar practitioners (van Maanen & Barley, 
1984; Constant, 1987). Brown & Duguid’s solution is “intercommunal negotiation” of 
differently practising individuals, challenging and stretching each other’s assumptions about 
ways of working. Cross-functional teamworking is an organisational setting that promotes 
this kind of intercommunal negotiation.  
 
But the real value of cross-functional teamworking appears to be the channels it opens to the 
bodies of knowledge that are exogenous to the team. This is confirmed by recent research by 
Keller (2001), which shows that there is an important mediating variable between cross-
functional diversity in a team and performance: external communications. By itself functional 
diversity had a strong, negative direct effect on budget performance, and no direct effect on 
schedules, but the presence of external communications effects improvement to technical 
quality, schedule and budget performance, but reduces group cohesiveness.  
 
From this discussion several threads of research point to a view that cross-functional 
teamworking may be regarded as an organisational means of promoting the exchange of 
knowledge and practice across disciplines and communities. The literature suggests that this 
benefits creative activities such as new product development but there are associated 
penalties with regard to technical performance and professional career development. The 
picture that emerges is one of teamworking as organisational design (Galbraith, 1994; 
Mohrman et al., 1995; Tranfield et al., 2000) to promote knowledge sharing, as well as 
efficiency in operations.  
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4. Method 
 
The empirical research presented here consists of two case studies of companies attempting 
to design and implement contrary organisational designs to manage essentially the same sorts 
of problems that arise in project-based, complex task environments. The two case study 
organisations, LandTraining Simulations and Visual Displays1 both operate in high-tech 
project-based businesses in related sectors and provide differentiated products to many of the 
same customers. The products and solutions they develop require integrated contributions 
from several diverse knowledge fields and technical disciplines. The major development 
facilities of both are located within the same region in the south east of England, although 
they have corporate affiliations in North America.  
 
For these similarities the firms make comparable case studies for comparison. Although one, 
LandTraining is a division of a much larger organisation and the other, Visual Displays is 
independent; LandTraining is quite autonomous in terms of its organisational operations and 
management. The two face similar structural constraints from country, region and industry, 
have similarly sized workforces with similar skill sets, and need to cope with the same 
problems of knowledge integration and uncertain, discontinuous business conditions. What is 
particularly intriguing for research purposes with these two case studies is that despite the 
resemblance, each has designed and implemented organisational changes that move in 
contrary directions. LandTraining Simulations has moved from project-based, cross-
functional teams to a predominantly functional organisation, while Visual Displays has done 
the reverse.  
 
The research was aimed at exploring and understanding the teamworking and knowledge 
dynamics and the effects of the reorganisations. The research process was influenced by the 
procedures and thinking of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Grounded theory is an inductive approach to research that is concerned with avoiding 
preconceptions and the tautological confirmation of them. It is useful for research aiming at 
deep contextual understanding where labelling and analysis is tightly coupled to observed or 
recorded phenomena. In LandTraining Simulations the author conducted 15 face-to-face 
interviews with Software Team Leaders, Project Managers, Managers for Systems 
                                                 
1  These names are used instead of the actual companies’ for reasons of confidentiality. 
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Engineering and Purchasing, a Systems Architect and a Director for Engineering and 
Software. In Visual Displays 13 interviews were conducted with product team managers, 
technical development managers, programme managers, directors of sales & marketing, 
product strategy, operations and corporate organisation. The interviews had a mean length of 
one hour each. 
 
Company documentation was also collected and analysed, including organisational diagrams, 
internal presentations used to support the initiatives and process and procedure documents 
such as work breakdown structures. The interviews were semi-structured but diversions from 
the “script” were also explored and recorded as respondents occasionally raised important 
issues that were unanticipated.  The interviews were taped, transcribed and the data was 
systematically coded according to categories, properties and dimensional scales (Strauss and 
Corbin, Ibid.). For example, the following quote from one project manager:   
 
 
…if you’re designing a switch box then the electrical guys are designing all the wiring and 
the circuit, and the mechanical guy [is] designing the box to put it in and where on a 
particular piece of equipment this box is going to fit, so they work very closely together.    
And that has been a problem in the past; that the electrical guys go off and do their thing, 
the mechanical guys go off and do their thing and when you come to actually put this unit 
together it doesn’t fit… that’s improved now, it only happens once and its improved it, it 
is just a matter of banging heads together. 
 
was coded as follows: 
 
Category: Team Knowledge Requirement  
Property: Product integration 
Dimensional Scale: Cross-Discipline Interaction – No Interaction.  
 
All interviews were systematically coded in this way, building up a table of variables for each 
organisation. Relationships between these variables were then mapped, which allowed the 
subsuming of many of them, revealing five categories that were common to both 
organisations; Organisational Change; Effects on Knowledge Integration; Loss Effects and 
Problems; Deployment of Expertise and Evolution.  
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Such grounded theory procedures intrinsically involve subjective interpretation but efforts are 
made to leave an audit trail and to validate the constructs with others to check for empirical 
reliability. The results were verified with the practitioners from the firms through interactive 
workshops and written reports, as well as academic colleagues. Finally follow-up interviews 
were conducted approximately one year after the initial interviews in order to check that the 
results were robust over time and not unduly affected by the “snapshot” approach. In fact this 
revealed what had subsequently occurred in the firms and resulted in the fifth factor, 
evolution. The two firms are compared under each of the five key factors below.  
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5. The Case Studies 
LandTraining Simulations  
 
LandTraining Simulations is a provider of customised simulators and training solutions to 
military and civilian markets. It is based in the South East of the United Kingdom, but is a 
division of a 5000-employee international business headquartered in North America. Because 
of volatility in the defence industry and the project-based nature of the business, the 
division’s workforce fluctuates from year-to-year from 60- 200 staff. Its products support 
training of land-based military applications such as for air defence, artillery and tanks, and 
battle command and control simulation. Civilian applications include simulators to train 
airline pilots. The products are typically high value, highly customised or one-off units. They 
are complex products to develop, requiring the integration of various engineering disciplines; 
software, design, databases, production, electro-mechanical and electronic. In addition 
specialist knowledge of the applications is required, such as image generation or user-end 
knowledge such as the behaviour of artillery in the field.  
 
Increasingly LandTraining Simulations has had to recruit and build capability in a new and 
different product area, microcomputer-based training (CBT), which is proving to be an 
effective and low-cost alternative to high-end customised simulators2. In response, 
LandTraining Simulations has been trying to effect a shift in thinking away from technology 
and equipment to training needs and solutions. 
 
Visual Displays  
 
Visual Displays is a supplier of high-end screen displays and structures for a wide range of 
visualisation applications. These include corporate presentation and broadcasting, training 
devices and a growing range of applications in virtual reality for education and engineering, 
as well in entertainment. Visual was created in 1984 to take advantage of the trend towards 
outsourcing of subsystems in simulators. While the firm is developing markets for the newer 
applications its core customer base remains that of simulators in the same way as their 
neighbour LandTraining, for whom they have supplied screen modules. The firm is organised 
around three core cross-functional teams that specialise in specific product lines. Although 
this permits a degree of standardisation, the workflow is project based and involves high 
degrees of customisation for each client. The production of these display systems requires the 
integration of knowledge bases in electronics, mechanical engineering, software, and 
structural design as well as specific know-how in optics, projectors and mirrors. Increasingly, 
Liquid Crystal Displays are being introduced to this product market. 
 
The firm has been growing at a steady rate of around 20% for 10 years and is entering a stage 
of consolidation and maturity, as distinct from its early period as an entrepreneurial start-up. 
It currently has170 employees, most of which are at the firm base in the same simulation 
cluster as LandTraining Simulations. Visual Displays also has sales and marketing branches 
and a spin-off Virtual Reality company in North America.  
                                                 
2 This trend shows the characteristics of a disruptive technology (Christensen, 1997); simpler and more 
affordable solutions to customers’ training needs. 
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Insert Table One around here 
 
 
 
5.1 Organisational Change and the Role of Boundary Objects 
 
The first category relates to the transitions in the two organisations; the motivations for them 
and the artefacts and tools- so called boundary objects- that were developed to facilitate the 
changes. 
   
LandTraining Simulations 
 
LandTraining Simulations’ organisation structure was previously oriented around project-
based, cross-functional teams, in which engineers worked for “heavyweight” project 
managers. This has changed to a functional system organised around technical disciplines 
called “resource groups”, with project managers procuring pieces of work as deliverables 
from the functional managers. Groups from each discipline are assigned to the project with 
one engineer designated as the group leader for that project.  
 
It has been argued that this form of organisation effectively relegates functional managers to 
the position of suppliers of resources, which tends to encourage their co-operation from a 
project management viewpoint (Donnellon, 1993). The reorganisation was motivated by two 
concerns; firstly management were aware that under the prior system an engineer with a 
particular skill may have been required on one project and “owned” by another team. The 
change was intended to make engineering resources more widely accessible and allocated 
more suitably. Secondly, engineers had been dissatisfied with the old project-based system 
because they were frequently working in isolation from their technical peers. The transition 
to functional groups was attempting to re-establish closer ties within the disciplines. The 
engineers took advantage of a move to a new building with large, open-plan space and set up 
their workspaces in functional tribal settlements.  
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To support the changes representatives of all functions were involved in the creation of 
graphical process maps, showing linkages between the key players and groups in the new 
project process. These maps were devised by a cross-functional working group, effectively 
serving as boundary objects (Star, 1992), artefacts that embody and symbolise negotiated 
agreement between the different communities (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Carlile, 2002). By 
contrast Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the measurement of overheads, project 
completions, overspend etc. were developed at engineering development meetings and 
implemented within the functions. While the interfaces between communities are agreed at 
the boundaries and embodied in the process maps, the KPIs enable measurement within the 
functional communities. 
 
Insert Figure One around here 
 
 
Visual Displays 
 
Visual Displays’ reorganisation was antithetical to LandTraining Simulations’. Visual moved 
from a functional system into three cross-functional teams that specialise on three product 
lines; firstly, wide “panorama” style screens; second, wraparound, spherical screens with 
several projectors blending to generate the image, and third, special customised products with 
a rear-mounted projector. Each team has between 10 and 20 projects ongoing within the 
product line. Bids, sales and marketing and R&D functions were located outside of the 
product teams. Project managers were combined together with electronic, mechanical and 
commissioning engineers in the multidisciplinary teams, in order to achieve a greater 
customer focus and relationship. There was also a desire to promote learning across 
disciplines, as the firm’s corporate organisation director explained “Ideally a display engineer 
is multidisciplinary, he is an expert in one technology but knows something about all of them. 
The idea of the teams was that engineers would pick up skills from the other disciplines.”  
 
To compensate for breaking up the functional disciplines, a new management role was 
introduced, the Technical Development Manager (TDM). TDMs were appointed for 
electronic design, mechanical design and programme management and were intended to 
provide leadership for the functional discipline. Although “owned” by an individual team, the 
idea was that they would lead their functional communities across the organisation. This is a 
quasi-matrix device often recommended for project-based organisations (e.g. Hobday, 2000).  
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 Visual Displays’ reorganisation was a much more planned and deliberate strategy than 
LandTraining Simulations’. The perceived need for a more formal organisation design to 
improve communications came about because of the firm’s growth of 30% per annum. The 
directors wanted to mix up disciplines, which they felt had become large enough to become 
too entrenched and internally focused. Similarly to LandTraining, this was an effect of the 
previous building which encouraged “groupishness” through its architecture of several small 
rooms, each of which housed a co-located functional group. The reorganisation preceded a 
move to a new building, which permitted large, open plan spaces.  
 
There was a 12-month process of design, advocacy and planning during which all disciplines 
were consulted. The initiative was managed by a cross-functional working group involving 
strategic retreats, regular presentations on the new organisation structure, with consultation 
on details like job designs.  The initiative was supported by internal publicity including a 
countdown poster campaign and T-shirts. A definite “D-Day” date was set when people 
would move desks and took up their new roles.   
 
This long period of consultation served to span boundaries between the disciplinary 
communities, so that the new organisation design was built on a base of consensual 
legitimacy. Similarly to the process maps in LandTraining, an important boundary object 
developed in Visual Displays was a cross-team Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). This was 
intended to give an operational focus to complement the product focus achieved by the 
reorganisation. Previously projects and functions had their own spreadsheets, databases and 
time-reporting cost. The introduction of the WBS meant that they could now plan and 
measure against the same codes, and could begin using enterprise management tools. The 
WBS was based on a Product Structure, a hierarchical architecture of product subassemblies 
and components, negotiated jointly between engineers of all the disciplines.  
 
The WBS is an effective boundary object, framed at a high enough level to allow discretion 
over the activities reported within the codes, but allowing for monitoring of overspending, 
code categories include, for instance, technical investigation, performance characteristics 
review, system testing and so on. This is an example of the distinction between the framing 
and content of complex management problems and solutions, as shown by Fiol (1994). 
Consensus is achieved with the framing of the problem; the need for accounting and 
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accountability; the cash flow pressures of a project-based organisation; the need for common 
approaches to project management for better integration; but leaving sufficient scope for the 
inescapable content discrepancies and divergences within the agreed structure. In both 
companies boundary objects played an important role in facilitating the reorganisations 
through providing informational support and symbolising agreement between the 
communities.   
 
Insert Figure Two around here 
 
5. 2. Effects on Knowledge Integration 
 
The second category refers to the task of integrating the diverse knowledge bases in the 
development and installation of products. This involves teamworking through consulting 
colleagues, reviewing, verifying and final integration both within and between the newly 
created teams. 
  
LandTraining Simulations 
 
The integration of knowledge resources is stressed as a key capability for turning the 
ownership of those resources into competitive advantage (Grant, 1991; 1996a; 1996b). For 
both LandTraining and Visual, the major problems of projects arise with integrating the 
pieces of the project together. These problems tend to occur late on in the production phase. 
Integration is complex and all about teamworking. But “teamworking” in this task 
environment is generally a matter of individuals independently completing their project 
pieces and validating these with others prior to the pieces being integrated “…most people 
can work largely in isolation, they are following their schedules that are laid down on the 
Gantt charts, but they’re generally doing fairly individual things…”3  or more bluntly 
“…people don’t tend to talk to other people, they just sit and code their chunk.” 4  
 
However communication becomes critical at the integration stage, as explained by this 
Software Team Leader: 
 
                                                 
3 Author’s interview with Software Team Leader A, LandTraining Simulations. 
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…you can still break it down into bits, and they go off and do their bit and then come back 
and say, “I have finished”. And it’s at that point that you’ve got to fit all the bits together 
and hopefully, they talked to each other whilst it has been going on, and then fitting all the 
bits together is a lot easier...in the end, if people have been speaking then it all comes 
together much more smoothly, it wastes a lot less time in trying to iron out problems5.  
 
So although the teamworking in the company is not interdependent on a task level in the 
short term, in the sense that one team member cannot proceed without a colleague’s actions, a 
high degree of communication is important in integrating the quite different knowledge bases 
together. Problems occur if validation and cross-checking has been insufficient and these 
problems are exacerbated if engineers are part-time players on a project. However, in general, 
managers in LandTraining reported a preference for the new functional system shortly after 
the change was made. They found that engineers were less tied-up than in the prior project-
teamworking system.  
 
Visual Displays 
 
Meanwhile, combining technical disciplines in product teams had improved integration 
processes in Visual Displays. The firm had previously had problems that would only appear 
at the final stage of installation at the customer’s site. Design and production engineers would 
only learn that their systems were not fitting together when the problem reached crisis-point. 
Following the reorganisation commissioning engineers’ feedback on integration problems is 
communicated directly to the designers and engineers in the product teams at an early stage. 
Engineers have a greater sense of the “big picture”, understanding the issues and problems of 
their colleagues in other disciplines. 
 
However in spite of the improvement in knowledge integration in the product development 
teams, breakdowns in knowledge transfer continued to occur between the teams and the 
external services and functions. The non-technical bids and business development functions 
are dependent on the product teams engineering knowledge, and frequently need to interrupt 
their workflow. There are similar problems between R&D and the product teams where new 
product prototypes are passed over to the product teams at a stage they consider too early. 
These are typical problems that arise in complex organisations where knowledge integration 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Author’s interview with Software Team Leader C, LandTraining Simulations. 
5 Author’s interview with Software Team Leader B LandTraining Simulations. 
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is an inter-team, as much as an intra-team organisational problem (Grant, 1996a; 1996b; 
2001; Sapsed et al., 2002).  
 
5. 3. Loss Effects and Problems 
 
The third common category was associated with various perceptions of loss and 
dispossession resulting from the reorganisations. 
 
LandTraining Simulations 
 
One objective of the change to functional organisation was to satisfy engineers’ needs for 
exposure and organisational proximity to their disciplinary community.  
 
…one of the problems that the guys found in the project teams and they were always 
moaning because…you might have three, four software engineers on a project where there 
were thirty or forty in the company and they got isolated over in their project group and 
they were always talking to the ‘leccies [electrical engineers] and the clankies [mechanical 
engineers] and they never got to talk to their colleagues [laughs] so they always felt a bit 
sort of isolated from their colleagues and felt they were missing out on the engineering 
chit-chat that goes on and the cross-fertilisation and in a way I think they felt a lack of 
technical leadership.6
 
Organisation into functional groups has effectively addressed this desire for regular contact 
with disciplinary peers. But there is a corresponding denuding of the project manager. Some 
complained of the loss of their previous pastoral role, where the project manager was 
responsible for all the team members’ appraisals and personal development. Another 
frustration is the shift in authority between the project manager and the resource group 
manager:  
   
I’ve got no-one in this company that works for me so I have not only got to manage people 
who are working for my project, I have also got to manage the management because I am 
dependent on them as well. I’m dependent on them to release the resources - the resources 
that I want at the time I want them.7
 
This belies the view that this form of organisation relegates functional managers to mere 
“supplier” status as described by Donnellon (1993). The experience in LandTraining 
                                                 
6 Author’s interview, Project Manager A, LandTraining Simulations. 
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Simulations suggests commitment to release resources can be difficult to attain and that the 
balance of power favours the functional manager. 
 
Visual Displays 
 
Visual’s shift from functional teams to cross-functional teams brought the equal and opposite 
effects to LandTraining’s reversion to functions. One director commented “I think we’ve lost 
some things. I think we’ve lost technical specialisms. When all the designers worked 
together, they learned a lot from each other.”8 Lack of regular exposure to technical peers has 
the effects of eroding the currentness of the individual engineers’ skill sets and losing the 
benefits of disciplinary communities of practice. One Product Team manager explained  
 
…as a company although we’re quite small, we’ve got quite a cross section of engineering 
skills, when you look at all three teams. When you look at them [the engineers] 
individually unfortunately, it tends to narrow them down a bit. That’s not just my view… 
we’re aware that their skill levels are very directed towards their own team, and really 
couldn’t jump straight into another team and start working effectively. That would not 
happen9. 
 
Although gaining a sense of the ‘big picture’ for their team’s product, the engineers lose the 
overall viewpoint of the organisation. A corollary of team specialisation on products is a 
tendency towards balkanisation on product lines rather than functions “…it has almost set up 
three different companies”, one Technical Development Manager observed. The TDM role of 
maintaining technical community across the teams has proved difficult to achieve as the 
pressures of current projects in the product team take priority: 
 
… unfortunately you’re up against team leaders who control their own teams and they’re 
not going to really want their staff to spend a lot of time doing for example, learning about 
another product, spending time with another team. If for example, Panorama is stuck for 
one design engineer, they need one from another team, that is their first port of call that’s 
what they’ve got to say, “well, I need another person, can these other teams supply him” 
and they’ll immediately go on the defensive saying ”Oh no, we can’t let anyone go” 
[laughs] I’m not suggesting that is the case but sometimes maybe it is. You may end up 
employing some contractor, get round it some other way. So that side of it is not so 
flexible, [if] we had all the design engineers in one group, it’s just a case of moving work 
around between them, because the team environment was not an issue. It does tend to put 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Author’s interview, Project Manager A, LandTraining Simulations. 
8 Author’s interview, Director A, Visual Displays. 
9 Author’s interview, Technical Development Manager A, Visual Displays. 
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up walls, there’s no doubt about that. It’s got its pluses and its minuses, if you ask my 
opinion it’s got more pluses than minuses.10
 
This shows that in some respects knowledge sharing and teamworking was actually damaged 
as a result of introducing cross-functional team structure. In both cases there were significant 
loss effects as a result of the re-orientations of teams. 
 
5. 4. Deployment of Expertise 
 
The fourth category relates to expertise; how it develops and becomes specialised, the 
implications of this specialisation for the organisation, and how experts and gurus are 
deployed. 
 
LandTraining Simulations 
 
The software and engineering teams in LandTraining contain a diversity of specialised 
knowledge bases. Individuals within teams tend to develop specific know-how, for instance 
in image generation or user interfaces, and are then deployed on tasks in subsequent projects 
that draw on this same knowledge. Over time they accumulate an expertise and this 
specialisation is reinforced on successive projects. The downside of this is that this 
knowledge is uneven across the teams and the organisation. The one or two experts on a key 
technology or tool are not always available when their expertise is demanded, presenting a 
major resource-loading problem. This specialism may be in a particular engineering field, for 
example, all three software teams call upon an engineer with expertise in sound. Specific 
product knowledge is also rare and valuable. One software manager describes the dilemma 
associated with one engineer’s rare knowledge of the DEC PDP product family11 as well as 
the specific application: 
 
…this particular guy who’s been here a long time, and he has got excellent experience in a 
number of areas, and the thing is he is a major player on one of the current projects, and if 
we get this Skyfire [project] we will need him very badly for that one because he used to 
work on Skyfire many, many years ago and its an old PDP product. Most of us don’t have 
any knowledge of PDPs now; none of us know really how that product used to work apart 
from him… Generally our products now are PC-based, this one’s in the days of PDP. So 
                                                 
10 Author’s interview, Technical Development Manager A, Visual Displays. 
11 The DEC PDP was a line of minicomputers in the 1960s, which later evolved into micro or supermicro 
computers in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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he’s currently allocated …But he is really needed on Skyfire as well, so if we win Skyfire, 
what the hell do we do? He’s allocated up to his eyeballs so we are almost just hoping that 
he can finish that before we go on Skyfire, and I don’t know how the hell you’d ever train 
up someone to pick up Skyfire. Yes, you might get someone who knows PDP and who 
knows Assembler and things like that, but they won’t know the product.12   
 
From a project-completion viewpoint, it makes more sense to deploy the specialists on tasks 
rather than the less-experienced: 
 
Most engineers are capable of doing all the tasks, it’s just how efficient they will do those 
tasks … you know that if you can get someone else to do it, but it’s going to take twelve 
weeks, as opposed to someone who can do it in two weeks. You know, because they have 
got to be trained for eight weeks and then they make loads of mistakes and then that’s got 
to be redone, and they have got to have all the training there and so on. So people are very 
much in their own little area and I don’t think it is a bad thing I think that really does focus 
people’s skills most of the time, and I think it does mean we get a much better product in 
my view…13
 
However, there is also the recognition that this reinforcement of expertise tends to promote a 
teamworking structure around knowledge specialisms, which undermines the firm’s 
organisational strategy:   
 
…I think as far as the company’s future is concerned I think having people in those areas 
is a very good way of going, and I think, it’s probably true of most areas for most 
companies software-wise... What we don’t want in the company of course is an I[mage] 
G[eneration] team and a GUI [Graphical User Interface] team and a core services team. 
That’s not the way the company has been structured, but effectively it is because we have 
one or two people who do GUIs, some of them do IGs and so on, and we keep those 
people in those areas of work…. I just think these people are in those specialist areas, so 
you almost have two levels of teams, in some respects.14
 
Specialist experts then do not appear to be affected by the reorganisation in terms of their 
everyday activities. However LandTraining also has a small group of generalist experts. 
These are the “Throbbing Heads”, gurus who possess rare knowledge bases combining know-
how from all the engineering domains that go into producing simulators, albeit uneven. This 
expertise has accumulated over years of experience in the industry, and is complemented by 
insights into the idiosyncrasies of the business process, and the dynamics of competition.  
 
                                                 
12 Author’s interview with Software Team Leader A, LandTraining Simulations. 
13 Author’s interview with Software Team Leader C, LandTraining Simulations. 
14 Author’s interview with Software Team Leader C, LandTraining Simulations. 
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LandTraining’s management have deployed these experts as “systems architects” focusing 
their attention largely on the bid stage of the process. This design was attempting to provide 
an overview to more accurately cost bids and assess the feasibility of prospects. The 
functional teams could be seen to have a fragmented and “localised’ perspective on bids and 
the systems architect role was introduced to provide overview, which is seen as critical to bid 
work. Previously, there was a perceived discontinuity from bid team to project team, which 
were typically entirely different sets of people. Under the new system the Systems Architects 
work intensively on the bid, defining the engineering solution and cost framework. Following 
contract award their involvement tapers off, but is still available as a resource for 
consultation.  
 
Visual Displays 
 
Visual Displays also has a small number of highly experienced engineers named the “display 
gurus”. One director explains: 
 
There are a handful of people in the company that you can identify as a display guru. We 
can’t go to the universities and take graduates who’ve taken a course in display systems, 
because of course those courses don’t exist, so we’ve got to breed them ourselves, develop 
them and train them. They are very much a multi-disciplinary person - its electronics 
expertise, mechanical, design, optical, software; it’s a mixture of all those things.15
 
But unlike LandTraining Simulations these experts are deployed as a Research and 
Development (R&D) team, working on a variety of internal projects that address the 
applications that the market will want in years to come. This is consistent with the Visual 
organisation design in which the “erudite overview” should be less critical than in 
LandTraining, because of the compensating influence of the Technical Development 
Managers and the cross-fertilisation in the teams. In practice the interface between the R&D 
team, bids and the product teams is problematic, the point at which prototypes are passed on 
to the more commercially –oriented teams is ambiguous. In addition the accumulated 
expertise of the display gurus is not easily accessible to the product engineers since they are 
organisationally and philosophically separate. R&D engineers nevertheless find themselves 
distracted from their R&D projects by bid work, in effect enacting the Systems Architects 
role in LandTraining. Both organisations find their specialists are deployed more or less on 
                                                 
15 Author’s interview with Director A, Visual Displays. 
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the same tasks as before the changes, while their generalists’ time is spread thinly on support 
activities. 
 
   
5.5  Evolution 
 
This fifth category, evolution, was added following validation research visits one year after 
the initial fieldwork was conducted. It captures the subsequent adaptation to the new system, 
which to some extent might also be interpreted as ‘slippage’ into the original state. 
 
LandTraining Simulations 
 
LandTraining’s organisational structure has changed significantly since implementation of 
the changes. The previous section referred to the “teams within teams” that exist within 
LandTraining Simulations as an effect of knowledge specialisations.  Subsequent to the 
reorganisation, the large software team of 25 people has been formally divided into three 
small teams, focusing on projects requiring three distinctive software competences, as well as 
some “floaters” who will work in all areas. To some degree then, project-based team 
structure has re-emerged, which reintroduces the concern among engineers that they will 
become too embedded in one area of application. One software team leader put it “…I think 
people are a little bit unsure and unhappy about [it] because not everyone likes the category 
they’re currently working on and the…thing is ‘well, am I going to get stuck in this one?’”16  
 
In addition, some cross-functional teamworking has been reintroduced. For projects that 
involve a high degree of novelty for the firm, project managers have asserted the need for a 
dedicated team of people drawn on a full-time basis from the resource groups. The resulting 
organisation is rationalised as CFTs for new, novel projects, functional organisation for 
familiar, “business as usual” work. 
  
Visual Displays 
 
                                                 
16 Author’s interview with Software Team Leader A, LandTraining Simulations. 
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Similarly, some of the old order is re-emerging in Visual Displays. Physical layout now 
resembles the previous structure, as team members of the same discipline have all moved 
their desks together. This is professedly because of the differing preferences for lighting and 
noise levels between the functions, but may also be interpreted as the tribal instinct returning.  
 
Again similar to LandTraining, another management layer has formed in all three product 
teams. The original design was attempting to maintain as flat a hierarchy as possible, but the 
size of the teams was too large for one team leader to handle. In fact, the senior management 
of Visual is considering another reorganisation to address some of the deficiencies of the 
current system. These include the inter-team breakdowns of knowledge transfer noted above 
e.g. making the product teams more responsible for bids work and trying to better integrate 
product team engineers and R&D engineers working on new product development. 
 
Although the development from the original designs is categorised as evolution, correcting 
and adapting the system after intervention, it is interesting that both organisations have 
reverted to previous practice to some extent. This could also be viewed as the attraction to 
homeostasis, as described in Schon’s (1971) “Stable State”. Certainly this applies as regards 
the reaction of the disenfranchised elements; project managers needing to direct a dedicated 
team for a difficult project; the impulse for engineers to colocate with their peers. These 
issues are discussed more generally in the conclusions. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
 The Antinomy of Cross-Functional Diversity and Specialisation 
 
The contrasting experience of the two cases shows how the benefits of specialisation bring 
the converse disadvantages. While cross-functional teamworking brings some benefits from a 
product viewpoint, there is a corresponding loss in disciplinary collegiality. Organisation on 
functional lines tends to the antithetical problems of disempowered project managers and 
challenges the integrity of projects. There appears to be no single “best practice” for 
teamworking organisation in complex task environments. There is a direct antinomy, a 
contradiction of equally valid principles between the advantages and drawbacks of cross-
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functional teamworking organisation. One seasoned project manager from LandTraining 
Simulations suggested the organisation design should be influenced by the external 
conditions prevailing at the time; if engineers are in demand then accommodate them in a 
favourable structure, whereas in lean times for the firm, deploy them for organisational 
benefit: 
 
As long as I’ve been in the industry, it’s never been resolved, there’s always this 
movement, we’ve always been going backwards and forwards between one way or the 
other… I don’t think there is an answer, if there is someone would have had it. We’re 
stuck with it, the fact that we are always changing, people can recalibrate it. And again the 
priorities change you see, if the job market is tight [for] your project engineers you’ve got 
to be a bit more careful as to how you look after engineers, and how you feed their 
aspirations. If you’re in a situation where, there’s a shortage of people out there, or 
recessionary times, and also you haven’t got much work you’ve got to do, got financial 
pressures, then perhaps you give less priority to that, you worry about other issues, just 
getting the job done, and again it’s a lot of external influences that could factor in.17
 
From the other side a Visual Displays Director concurs on the pros and cons of functional 
versus cross-functional structures: 
 
We have achieved a good part of what we wanted to achieve, we certainly have removed a 
lot of the barriers that we had, the internal walls, where problems were thrown over walls, 
what you do find is, you almost can’t win in some respects, you knock down some walls 
and others emerge in other places. The issue is more one of wherever the walls pop up, 
trying to squash them down again, it’s a constant battle. I don’t believe there is any perfect 
ideal structures, the nature of our business is we’re full of matrix structures in our 
organisation, and its not just one simple matrix, it’s a number of multidimensional 
matrices going on. The challenge is trying to identify where the walls are happening and 
trying to do things to minimise them.18
 
Both firms were quite sensitive to the positive and negative effects of their teamworking 
designs. Various mechanisms and techniques were employed to mitigate the unfavourable 
consequences. Boundary spanning activities and objects were used and were important in 
promoting intercommunal negotiation, such as the process maps, Work Breakdown Structure 
and working groups. These helped to gain agreement and understanding of the new 
organisations.  
 
                                                 
17 Author’s interview, Project Manager B, LandTraining Simulations. 
18 Author’s interview with Director A, Visual Displays. 
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Less successful were the attempts to compensate for the loss effects of the new structures, 
such as the Technical Development Managers in Visual. The technical leadership role was 
not fulfilled as the same individuals were also assigned to specific product teams. This role 
may be more successful in better-resourced companies without the pressures of project-based 
workflow. Yet the antimony of diversity and specialisation is not easily remedied by 
organisational mitigating devices.    
 
Team “Design” and “Selection” 
 
Organisation design is a popular topic for theoretical literature and prescriptions for 
practitioners.  The paper outlined some often-cited ideas on designing for teamworking and 
for complexity.  Galbraith, (1972; 1994) for example, stresses the design of complex 
organisations. Wageman (1995) provides evidence to suggest that team design affects team 
performance significantly more than any subsequent coaching. The two cases here show 
some of the limitations of design, as an ex ante means of predictable control. In both cases 
the outcomes were quite different to the intended plan. Both showed some “slippage” to new 
hybrid forms. Similar to Mintzberg’s (1994; 1996) observations of emergent corporate 
strategies, it may be that that organisation designs are rarely implemented as they are 
conceived. They evolve and adapt and in a short space of time look quite different to the 
design. As illustrated by the two cases, they may exhibit self-organising properties as studied 
by work on complex open systems (for example the Organisation Science special issue on 
this topic, see Lewin, 1999 and others).   
 
The cases show how natural “self-organisation” occurs and that received knowledge profiles 
and prior structures have a continuing influence. LandTraining Simulations’ teams are 
actually more organised around specialised knowledge and skill sets, as noted by one of the 
software team leaders, in spite of the pronounced reorganisation. In real terms the necessary 
organisation emerges around specialisation and the scope for organisational engineering may 
be more limited than some of the management literature suggests. Moreover the cases give a 
flavour of organisational design on the ground, showing not a straight managerial choice 
between static archetypal designs, but a messy imperfect process of change and resistance to 
it. There are inevitably loss effects, and the choice of whether the benefits outweigh the 
losses is primarily a matter of managerial choice, rather than scientific calculation. This 
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author believes Keith Pavitt would agree with that, and would argue this is what managers 
are “presumably” paid for. He will be missed.  
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